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External debt and 
crisis: the decline 
of the orthodox 
strategy 
Robert Devlin* 
This article presents a general view of the reschedul-
ings of Latin American debts with the private banking 
system during the period 1982-1985. The marked 
worsening of the conditions of indebtedness ex-
perienced by the debtors in the first round of negotia-
tions in 1982-1983 has gradually given way to more 
favourab le te rms, above all in the most recent 
rescheduling (1984-1985). The creditors use market 
concepts to explain this phenomenon: the better terms 
represent a reward for good behaviour and the con-
sequent lessening of risk. 
T h e present analysis propounds another con-
ceptual framework for interpreting the facts, based on 
the notion of bilateral monopoly. According to this 
view, the favourable trend of the terms of reschedul-
ing was due not so much to some objective fun-
damental change in the image of creditworthiness of 
the borrowers as to their increased bargaining power, 
which enabled them to capture the monopoly rents 
obtained by the banks in the initial rounds of negotia-
tion. The study goes on to analyse the North-South 
debate on the heavy transfer of resources from the 
region to the creditor banks, concluding that this can-
not be justified by the conventional criteria of econom-
ic theory. Finally, within the framework of the bilateral 
monopoly, the study suggests various options that 
would permit the countries to reduce the transfer to 
the banks and thus give greater support to their own 
growth and development. 
*Staff member of the ECLAC Economic Development Divi-
sion. A more extensive version of this study was prepared for 
the Latin American Economic Research Corporation (CIE-
PLAN) during the author's tour of duty as a Visiting Researcher 
in the Research Programme on the Economy and In-
ternational Relations of that corporation, which enjoys the 
support of the Ford Foundation. The author wishes to express 
his gratitude for the comments offered by José De Gregorio, 
Enrique de la Piedra, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Adolfo Gurrieri, 
Manuel Marfan, Oscar Muñoz and Joseph Ramos. Guillermo 
Mundt provided valuable statistical assistance. 
I 
Rescheduling the debt: 
the first three rounds 
The multiple reschedulings of the debt in Latin 
America in recent years have followed a well-
defined course. In the first round, which began 
in August 1982, the debtor countries resched-
uled obligations maturing in a term of 12 to 36 
months. At the same time, in the case of a great 
many countries, the banks agreed to grant new 
credits for 1983, which represented an ex ante 
expansion of around 7% of the creditors' loan 
portfolio1 (see table 1). The negotiated cost of 
this exercise —defined in broad terms as includ-
ing the spread over I.IBOR, the amortization peri-
od and the commissions— was extremely high. 
In general, the countries had to pay a spread of 
over 2%, obtaining amortization periods of only 
six to eight years and facing fixed commissions of 
1.25% or more {see table 2). In comparison with 
the credit terms negotiated by the same countries 
in the Eurocurrency market before the onset of 
the crisis, the rescheduling conditions repre-
sented a serious reverse. In effect, using a com-
bined index based on the spreads over LIBOR, the 
amortization period and the commissions, it is 
estimated that most of the debtors suffered a 
deterioration in the negotiated cost of credit of 
between 100% and 250% (see table 3). 
The first round of reschedulings was fol-
lowed almost at once by another in 1983-1984, to 
reprogramme the 1984 maturities of some 
countries and to determine the amount of new 
resources that the banks would lend for that year. 
Although the terms imposed in the transactions 
remained relatively severe, they were somewhat 
better than those negotiated in the reschedulings 
of the first round. In general, the spreads were 
0.3 to 0.5 percentage points lower, the amortiza-
tion periods were lengthened by one or two years 
and the commisions dropped to under 1% (see 
table 2). The volume of new credits granted by 
the banks for 1984, however, was in general low-
er in value than the loans authorized for the 
previous year2 (see table 1). 
' The figure of 7% was reached by general agreement 
with the IMF (ECLAC, 1984a, p. 56), 
2 The new set of loans for Brazil was bigger than in 1983, 
but this rise was intended to compensate the country for the 
loss of short-term credit lines during 1982 and 1983. 
Table 1 
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Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division. 
a
 Refers to the value of the rescheduled amortization commitments and the years to which they correspond, plus the new credits granted by the banks as an 
integral part of this restructuring. The table does not include information on the maintenance of short-term credit lines and the bridging credits 
authorized by the United States Treasury, the Bank for International Settlements, etc. 
b
 In some cases these incorporate maturities already rescheduled in 1982/1983. 
c
 T h e agreement was never signed and the maturities were incorporated into the new agreement of 1984/1985. 
d
 T h e values correspond to 1985 and 1986 respectively. They include US$ 150 million guaranteed by the World Bank. 
c
 Private sector Commitments. 
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Table 2 
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Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division. 
4
 Short-term credits are not considered. The symbols are: 
M = spread over LIBOR; 
P = total period (in years) of amortization; and 
C = fixed commissions expressed as a percentage of the total value of the credit. 
Each column shows the conditions agreed with the banks for the reprogrammed maturities and the new 
credits. In cases where a country negotiated in a round both a reprogramming of maturities and the 
granting of new resources, the figure represents a weighted average of the two transactions. For more 
detailed information on these credit exercises, see ECLAC (1984b), tables 15 and 16,andEci.Ac(1985),pp. 
67 to 72. 
b
 This agreement never came into force. The corresponding maturities were incorporated in the agree-
ment which formed part of the third round. 
c
 This agreement is in suspense. 
Shortly after the end of the second round of 
reschedulings, the countries met again to discuss 
the restructuring of the maturities falling due 
from 1985 onwards. In this third round, which 
continued during 1985, a new improvement was 
observable —very marked this time— in the 
negotiated cost of credit. The spreads over LIBOR 
continued to display the declining trend noted in 
the second round; the amortization periods were 
extended (10 to 14 years) and the commissions 
were sharply reduced, falling even to zero in the 
cases of Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela (see 
table 2). In fact, it is evident that the credit terms 
achieved in the third round, taken as a whole, 
were somewhat better than those obtained in the 
Eurocurrency market prior to the crisis (see 
table 3). This result was also facilitated by the 
willingness of the creditors to extend the matur-
ity rescheduling horizon from a maximum of two 
or three years to between three and six years3. 
On the other hand, the banks have obviously 
become more restrictive with the new credits, 
since these were much scarcer in the third 
round4 (see table 1). 
In these three rounds of reprogramming, 
the private banking system has carried out the 
most massive restructuring of debts in the history 
3Other innovations were the option offered to the 
borrowing country to transfer its loans from the Prime rate to 
the lower LIBOR rate, and to incorporate the debt reprogram-
med in the first round into the more favourable conditions of 
the third. 
4Some countries did not ask for new credits, partly be-
cause they wished to improve their image of creditworthiness 
with a view to returning to the autonomous credit market. 
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Table 3 
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Source: Devlin (1983), p. 108; ECLAC (1985), pp. 67 to 69; and data provided by the Economic Development 
Division of ECLAC. 
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where: C = commissions; P = period of amortization and M = spread over 
LIBOR, and where the subscript 1 refers to the terms existing in the respective 
rounds of reschedulings and the subscript 0 to those which existed in the 
normal credit market of 1980-June 1981. All the elements of the formula refer 
to the reprogrammed debt and to the new credits and are weighted by the 
amount of credit. Note that the relative deterioration is strongly influenced by 
P„ the initial position of the borrower as regards the spreads, amortization per-
iods and commissions contracted in the market between 1980 and June 1981. 
In the reschedulings the State frequently had to give its guarantee in respect of the private sector's debt 
which previously did not carry this guarantee. This deterioration is not incorporated in the index. 
Improvement. 
of modern international finance. Besides this, 
the banks took great care to watch over their own 
interests in incorporating new credits into the 
rescheduling exercises, a procedure to which 
they had traditionally been opposed5. Neverthe-
less, even with the alleviation of the debt, the 
borrower countries have not succeeded in avoid-
ing serious obstacles to their economic growth 
and development. Perhaps the statistic which 
best sums up the difficult situation besetting the 
region is the per capita income: in 1984 it was 9% 
5 The subject of the new credits in the reprogramming 
arrangements is dealt with in more detail further on. 
lower than that recorded in 1980, and this re-
gional average conceals even worse conditions 
for some countries (ECLAC, 1984, table 1). At the 
same time, despite the obvious softening of the 
terms negotiated in the third round of reschedul-
ing, the growth prospects of the region are far 
from good. In fact, even the most optimistic 
observers acknowledge that the 1980s will be a 
lost decade for Latin America, and project a per 
capita income in 1990 which in the best of cases 
will be only slightly higher than that of 1980 
(Cline, 1984a, p. 195). Using less favourable 
assumptions, it is estimated that even the 1980 
level of income might not be regained. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: NET CAPITAL INFLOW AND TRANSFER OF RESOURCES 
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Source: ECLAC (1984a), p. 11; ECLAC (1984b), table 12, and data supplied by the ECLAC Division of Statistics and Quantitative 
Analysis. 
"Equals the net capital inflow less non-registered transactions. 
bCorresponds to the item "errors and omissions" in the balance of payments. 
•preliminary figures. 
The nub of the matter lies in the fact that, 
even after this relief of the debt burden (includ-
ing the new credits), Latin America will continue 
making enormous transfers of financial re-
sources to the creditor countries. Table 4 shows 
that the net balance between the entry of new 
capital and the outflow of resources in respect of 
factor services (which represent almost entirely 
interest payments) was very negative in 1982-
1984, with a transfer to the exterior which fluctu-
ated between the equivalent of 18% and 30% of 
the region's exports of goods and services. Such a 
transfer of resources was possible thanks to the 
rapid transformation, in the debtor countries, of 
a t rade deficit into substantial surpluses. 
Nonetheless, the latter were almost entirely 
achieved through the contraction of Latin Amer-
ica's imports, whose value fell by close on 40% in 
the course of those three years. With this abrupt 
reduction of foreign purchases, there was an in-
evitable collapse of economic activity and a fall in 
the gross domestic product in absolute terms. 
What was the reason for the large transfer 
which unleashed this adverse sequence of 
events? It was due to unprecedented world inter-
est rates, with an average LIBOR rate of between 
10% and 13%; unprecedented negotiated costs 
(spreads, amortization periods, commissions) on 
the rescheduled debts and the new loans; and a 
massive drop in the net inflow of capital, which 
during the 1970s had been more than sufficient 
to cover the deficit on factor services. This latter 
phenomenon was caused by the reluctance of the 
private banks to grant new loans to the Latin 
American countries after 1982 and to the con-
siderable flight of capital belonging to private 
economic agents6. 
The debt and the problems of the transfer of 
resources will certainly affect Latin America's de-
velopment policy in the coming years. In the 
6A rough idea of the effect of the flight of capital is given 
in column 2 of table 4, derived from the item "errors and 
omissions" of the balance of payments. 
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absence of international public action to alleviate the payments and free resources for investment 
the financial burden of these countries,7 the re- and growth. In these circumstances it is im-
gion will have to continue its ceaseless negotiations portant to examine the options which are open to 
with the private banks, while the countries seek the debtors, establishing in the first place the 
new formulas that will enable them to minimize framework for the negotiation process. 
II 
The framework for negotiations between 
creditors and debtors8 
1. Are market forces at work? 
In evaluating their own policies regarding the 
debt reschedulings, bankers frequently recur to 
market concepts. This is most evident in their 
arguments concerning the pricing of the 
rescheduling exercises. For instance, in the first 
round of reschedulings the creditors used one or 
more of the following to justify the sharp rise in 
the negotiated price of credit. 
Price elasticities. It was argued that the higher 
price would induce the refinancing of amortiza-
tion and the extension of net credit. As Gasser 
and Roberts (1982, p. 28) argued, "Clearly the 
more attractive the terms of the restructured or 
rescheduled debt, the more willing will be the 
participation of all banks, and a reasonably early 
resumption of lending will be more likely". 
Risk. Another argument frequently used to 
explain the higher price of credit was the greater 
risk involved in extending maturities beyond the 
dates originally agreed to in the loan contract: 
i.e., the greater price compensated for the great-
er risk. 
Moral hazard. Drawing from the literature on 
health insurance, some argued that the higher 
price was needed in order to provide the borrow-
ers with a disincentive for pursuing policies 
7For an analytical summary of the different proposals 
for solving the debt crisis, see Guergutl (1984). 
8This section is a synthesis of a more extensive and 
theoretical analysis found in Devlin (1985). The same article 
contains the related supporting documentation and bibliog-
raphical material. The 1985 article represents a further de-
velopment of Devlin (1984 and 1983a). 
which might lead to the need for rescheduling9. 
In other words, debtors had to be penalized, for 
otherwise they would be tempted to behave in 
ways which would lead to repeated repayment 
problems. 
All of the above arguments are market-
oriented and in one way or another imply that 
the supply curve was shifting upward and to the 
left in the first round of reschedulings, making 
credit more expensive. The improvement of the 
terms in the second round of the reschedulings 
was justified by the bankers on the ground that 
the debtors behaved well in the adjustment pro-
cess, reducing risks and moral hazard; in other 
words, the supply curve began to shift down and 
to the right again. The third round represented 
another downward shift in the supply curve. 
Thus, all developments are explained in terms of 
the "magic of the marketplace". But one must be 
suspicious of "ad hocery" when three arguments 
are employed simultaneously to explain a single 
phenomenon. Indeed, none of the arguments 
hold up under scrutiny. 
With regard to price elasticities, there is no 
empirical evidence to support the notion that a 
bank's willingness to reschedule debt is linked to 
a higher negotiated price of credit. It is almost 
9In the health insurance literature it is pointed out that 
the way a cliente behaves influences the need for services. 
After a premium is paid, the cost of health care is zero. This 
could induce an economic agent to behave in ways which 
would consume more health services than if there were posi-
tive marginal costs. Thus, to avoid moral hazard, most in-
surance companies require insured customers to pay a de-
ductible amount on each claim. 
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self-evident that banks reschedule not to make 
profits, but to avoid the large capital losses that 
would result if the borrower fell into open de-
fault. As for net credit, studies have shown that 
the reaction of banks to a rescheduling —even 
when the negotiated price has risen sharply— is 
to cut back exposure, not expand it. 
It is true that during the current series of 
reschedulings banks have extended new credits. 
But these new credits are really a disguised 
rescheduling of interest payments. In effect, 
borrowers have faced unsustainable interest pay-
ments equivalent to 30% or more of their export 
earnings. If banks had not extended the new 
loans, most borrowers would have ceased to pay 
interest, negating the commercial viability of the 
whole rescheduling exercise. In sum, the new 
credits are simply part of the overall administra-
tion of old debt and their appearance is due to 
the need to avoid capital losses rather than to the 
attractiveness of the price of the operation. 
There are of course many banks which were 
latecomers in the expansive phase of Latin 
America's credit cycle. These banks have a rel-
atively smaller exposure in the region and per-
haps were tempted to resist new lending even in 
the face of potential default. But their participa-
tion in the new credit packages was not due to the 
higher price; indeed, these banks were at their 
maximum point of credit rationing, at which no 
price would voluntarily elicit a supply. Their 
willingness to lend was basically due to coercion 
from the bigger banks, Central Bank authorities, 
the IMF, etc. This is confirmed by the fact that the 
smaller lenders took any opportunity they could 
to sneak out of the new loan packages even 
though the negotiated price of credit was at re-
cord levels. 
With regard to risk, there was no increase of 
this upon rescheduling debt. What the lenders 
faced in 1982 was the materialization of the risk 
that they had evaluated in the 1970s and for 
which they had charged a risk premium. In fact, 
the reschedulings actually lowered risk because 
without them the original default risk and con-
sequent losses would have appeared on the 
banks' balance sheets. Moreover, risk was further 
reduced by the monitoring of the economies by 
the IMF and by the ability of the banks to force 
governments to guarantee the debts of the debt-
or country's private sector. 
The moral hazard argument also is spurious. 
In a fair environment premiums for moral 
hazard are determined in a competitive 
framework and economic agents are aware of 
costs upon signing a contract. To charge a pre-
mium for this concept during a rescheduling ex-
ercise is arbitrary and equivalent to informing a 
patient of his health insurance premium after he 
is sick. Furthermore, in the economic literature it 
is well known that jacking up the price of credit 
—especially when borrowers are under stress— 
can increase moral hazard, not reduce it. On the 
one hand, borrowers must undertake more risky 
behaviour to meet the higher service payments. 
On the other, if the borrower is dishonest, the 
higher price of credit raises the benefits of open 
default. 
Indeed, the price of credit is not the true 
incentive to good behaviour. No country wants to 
enter into a rescheduling, because it means the 
interruption of its credits flows and external sav-
ings, which have a high rate of return. And as 
mentioned, if the borrower is inclined to default, 
the higher pricejust raises incentives for this type 
of action. In fact, the behaviour of economic 
agents cannot be controlled by economic in-
centives alone. The sign of a successful economic 
system is a sufficient trust between the principal 
economic agent and the subordinate so that the 
former assumes that the latter will not act in bad 
faith even if it were rational to do so. In other 
words, an integrated and efficient economic sys-
tem cannot be based on a homo economicus 
assumption, where all behaviour is based on a 
pure cost-benefit calculus. 
It is in this light that one can interpret the 
great responsibility with which most Latin Amer-
ican countries have confronted their debt obliga-
t ions, even when to do so has involved 
tremendous social costs and political risks. In 
effect, Latin American countries are integrated 
into the world capitalist system and largely share 
its values. Yet the enormous burden of the debt is 
working contrary to the continued economic in-
tegration of the region and threatens to un-
derpin political forces which wish to close the 
economies and reduce commitments to the in-
ternational capitalist system. It is precisely for 
this reason that there is an urgent need for new 
and more equitable ways of managing the debt 
problem. 
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2. The monopoly power of the banks 
We have seen that the banks' interpretation of 
the three rounds of reschedulings was con-
ceptually related to the market mechanism. But 
in reality there was no competitive market; in-
deed, if the market had been functioning debtor 
countries would have received relief via the clas-
sic market risk sharing device —default and de-
valuation of the banks' assets— much as they did 
in the 1930s. But in fact, in the first round ofthe 
reschedulings the banks avoided competition 
and losses by joining together to negotiate en bloc 
and by using the resulting monopoly power to 
pass the costs of their faulty risk evaluation ofthe 
1970s onto the borrowers. 
At the same time, the ex-post rise in the cost of 
debt that was imposed by the banks in the first 
round of reschedulings was a monopoly rent, or 
superprofit. A rent is a payment above that which 
is required for an economic agent to do what it 
does. In this case, the banks charged more for an 
administrative operation (the rescheduling of 
amortization and refinancing of interest) which 
was in any event necessary to avoid large capital 
losses. Moreover, the nearly uniform reduction 
in credit terms in the second round of the resched-
ulings is a good empirical indicator of the rents 
obtained in the first round. In effect, many 
countries won concessions without any objective 
improvement in their underlying economic 
situation and indeed some were accumulating 
arrears which the new credits were in part de-
signed to eliminate. The fact that most countries 
are paying terms in the third round which are 
better than those they contracted during the nor-
mal credit market of 1980/1981 is another good 
indication that monopoly rents were won by the 
banks during their management of the crisis. 
The rescheduling of debt and refinancing of 
interest payments in fact cannot be evaluated as a 
market transaction where there is a price for a 
determinate flow. The exercise takes place in the 
framework of a bilateral monopoly. The out-
come is theoretically imprecise and depends on 
the bargaining strength ofthe two parties. To the 
extent that the banks manage to impose 
rescheduling terms that permit them to elude the 
devaluation of their assets and losses that would 
come about from the free play of market forces, 
they are earning rents. These rents can be cap-
tured by the borrowers and are in fact now being 
captured by them. 
The situation can be illustrated in the man-
ner shown in figure I, which assumes that there is 
only rescheduling of capital that otherwise would 








— Maximum price accepted by the debtor to avoid 
default. 
= Minimum price accepted by the creditor to avoid 
default. 




It can be seen from the figure that in a bi-
lateral monopoly the supply and demand curves 
are superimposed upon one another over the 
amount of debt subject to reschedulings (Qo). 
The demand curve DD is perfectly inelastic be-
cause the debtor is insensitive to the price of 
credit in order to gain loans (Qo) sufficient to 
avoid default. Likewise, the creditor too is not 
precise about the price of a rescheduling because 
of the need to avoid default and the losses that 
would be confronted in the absence of a 
restructuring. For this reason the creditor also 
has a wide range of prices that are acceptable for 
lending QJ,. 
Nevertheless, the debtor will have a max-
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imum price for credit Pd above which it will be 
preferable to default. The creditor also will have 
a minimum price Pc below which it would be 
inclined to call a default. Thus there is a range of 
prices Pc - Pd for which an acceptable agreement 
can be reached. The result does not depend on 
the forces of supply and demand, but rather on 
the relative bargaining strength of the parties. 
In the first round of reschedulings the 
borrowers unwittingly accepted the banks' con-
ceptual framework and the price of credit 
approached Pd, providing the banks with large 
monopoly rents. Pd and the rents fell in the 
second and above all in the third round of the 
reschedulings. This had to do with the gradual 
improvement of the borrowers'joint bargaining 
power. On the one hand, there was consternation 
in many circles of the North and South owing to 
the exorbitant cost of the reschedulings; indeed, 
even the United States Congress called for a 
softening of terms in a public law it passed con-
cerning increased quotas for the IMF. On the 
other hand, debtor countries began to mobilize 
themselves, first in regional meetings, such as the 
Latin American Economic Conference in Quito 
in January 1984, followed by the joint declara-
tion of the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Co-
lombia and Mexico in May 1984, which con-
demned the high level of world interest rates. 
This last initiative eventually gave rise to a meet-
ing of 11 Latin American ministers in Cartagena, 
Colombia, in June 1984. 
While the debtor countries vigorously de-
nied any intention of forming a Debtors' Club, 
the banks became concerned about the growing 
solidarity among the borrowers and its potential 
for the formation of such a cartel. They there-
fore attempted to neutralize the new movement 
and offered to Mexico and later Brazil —the two 
most powerful debtors in the group)— the signifi-
cantly better terms that formed part of the third 
round of reschedulings10. Later, other debtors 
received roughly similar treatment. 
The strategy of the creditors temporarily 
paid off, as subsequent meetings of the 11 minis-
ters (now denominated the Cartagena Consensus) 
in Santo Domingo and Mar del Plata were ex-
1
 "Brazil never signed its rescheduling agreement and 
continues negotiating with the banks and the IMF. 
tremely dull affairs. However, in mid-1985 the 
creditors appear once again to be under pressure 
to reduce their rents. The slowdown of the 
United States economy has damaged prospects 
of relief via world recovery and turned off the 
light, faint though it was, that some debtors had 
perceived at the end of the debt crisis tunnel. 
Moreover, the Government of Cuba has taken 
the initiative on the debt problem, promoting in 
the region the idea that the debt cannot be paid 
and should therefore be forgiven by the North as 
one component in the restoration of a New In-
ternational Economic Order. Also, new dem-
ocratic governments, such as those in Brazil 
and Peru, have been displaying their profound 
displeasures with the orthodox management of 
the debt problem. 
In any event, is it possible to be somewhat 
more precise about Pc in figure I the limit below 
which a declaration of default becomes the pre-
ferred alternative of the bank? In the absence of 
externalities, it would be the price that brought 
losses just below those which would be incurred 
in the event of an open default. The determina-
tion of this price is quite difficult because of the 
reluctance of banks to enter into secondary trad-
ing of loan paper and because of the strong in-
fluence of bank regulatory authorities in the val-
uation of assets. But it is evident that Pc is well 
below the price agreed to in the first three rounds 
of reschedulings and indeed could even be 
negative11. 
The introduction of externalities greatly 
complicates the analysis. Without considering 
1 rFor example, suppose a bank had to call a default on 
loans worth USf 100 million. It could enter a small secon-
dary market to sell the paper. At the beginning of the crisis, 
Latin American paper experienced discounts of up to 20%. 
With a cost of funds of 10%, the loss to the bank would be 20% 
of principal ($ 20 million) plus 10% ($ 10 million). The 
return therefore is - 3 0 % [100 (1 + X) = 70]. In this case any 
agreement which offered a loss of less than 30% would be 
attractive to the creditor. A return higher than the market 
valuation would be a rent. One can arrive at similar con-
clusions by making assumptions about the behaviour of bank-
ing supervisors regarding their valuation of the bank's assets. 
In all probability the supervisors would spread the losses over 
time. Finally, it is worth mentioning that in early 1985 the 
discounts registered in secondary trading of Latin American 
paper were as follows: Argentina (30%); Brazil (20%); Bolivia 
(80%); Chile (35%); Mexico (15%); Nicaragua (90%); Peru 
(50%) and Venezuela (10%). 
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the action of other debtors, the creditors would 
perhaps accept a price for rescheduling debt that 
was well below a commercial rate. But the credi-
tor knows that if debts are rescheduled at less 
than a commercial rate, other debtors might de-
mand similar treatment. So the effective loss reg-
istered on one rescheduling could in fact be multi-
plied many times by the action of other debtors. 
In the light of this Pc would be considerably high-
er than that outlined in the example contained in 
the last footnote. Whether it is below the price 
registered in the third round of reschedulings is 
a matter of conjecture. But one suspects there is 
further room to reduce the rents; indeed, some 
countries such as Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua 
have in fact so far managed to drive the effective 
price down below that of the third rescheduling 
exercise by accumulating arrears. 
The same framework of a bilateral monopo-
ly can be used to evaluate the possibility of forc-
ing new credits from the banks. In effect, the new 
credits are indistinguishable from the old debt 
because they keep interest payments current and 
avoid a writedown of the portfolio. I have a 
It has already been observed that the financial 
crisis has had a devastating impact on Latin 
America's economic activity and per capita prod-
uct. A central factor in the situation was the 
transfer of financial resources from the debtor 
countries, which has resulted in a dramatic 
reduction in imports. This outflow is mainly due 
to two phenomena; i) the procyclical behaviour 
of the banks; and ii) the flight of capital. But, as 
will be seen further on, the second phenomenon 
cannot be entirely disassociated from the first. 
1. Transfers of resources to the private banks 
a) Good or bad? 
The Mexican financial crisis in August 1982 
brought with it a paralysation of bank credit to 
shown elsewhere (Devlin, 1985) that a borrower 
is more likely to be able to force new credits from 
the banks, the bigger its debt with them and the 
greater the reduction in the probability of de-
fault after the loan is extended. Thus new forced 
lending is easiest to achieve in a context of 
illiquidity and much more difficult to realize in a 
state of insolvency12. Moreover, an illiquid bor-
rower which is co-operative and inclined to com-
press its imports as much as is necessary to pay 
the debt is, ironically, less likely to obtain new 
credits than an illiquid borrower which is tough 
and threatens default if a high percentage of 
interest payments are not covered by new loans. 
Finally, the readiness to lend greatly de-
pends on the collective action of the banks, since 
no institution would have incentives to grant cred-
its in isolation. It is precisely in its role of co-
ordinator that the Bank Steering Committee is a 
"public good". Unfortunately, it has been noted 
that this group also has had its collusive aspect: it 
enabled the banks to act en bloc against isolated 
debtors in order to transfer to them the greater 
part of the costs of the crisis. 
Latin America, which in the 1970s had been ex-
panding at an annual rate of 30% or more13. In 
the face of the collapse of the autonomous credit 
supply, the creditor banks came to an agreement 
among themselves to provide new loans to the 
debtors as an integral part of the rescheduling of 
the debt. 
In the first round, the general formula of the 
l2Strictly speaking, the terms illiquidity and insolvency 
are commercial concepts not applicable to countries. Here 
the terms are used loosely to distinguish between debtors 
which have prospects of adjusting in a medium-term period 
and those which must undergo long-term restructuring of 
their economies in order to regain their creditworthiness. 
"Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. ( 1983, p. 6) and Ffrench-
Davis (1985, p. 2). 
Ill 
Strategies for shielding development 
from the burden of the debt 
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creditors was to expand the loans by around 7%. 
Nevertheless, the interest rates at that time were 
on average somewhere in the region of 12% (in-
cluding the spreads), which meant a pro-
grammed transfer to the banks equal to 5% of the 
existing obligations. This had a serious adverse 
effect on the debtors, since just before the crisis 
they were receiving a positive contribution from 
the banks equivalent to close on 6% of these 
obligations, so that there was in fact a total pro-
grammed turnaround of 11% in credit flows14. 
The transfer of financial resources to the 
banks was and continues to be a very con-
troversial topic. Latin American analysts—for ex-
ample ECLAC (1983 and 1984a); Prebisch (1985), 
p. 50; Ffrench-Davis and Molina (1985), pp. Ill 
10 to 13; and Ferrer (1984), pp. 309 to 311 
— have vigorously criticized the process. On one 
occasion ECLAC (1983, p. 9) even called it "per-
verse", in that it was premature in relation to the 
level of the region's development. 
On the other hand, many analysts from the 
North are accustomed to defend the negative 
transfers as the only way of "solving" the finan-
cial crisis of the region. By way of example, Cline 
(1984a, p. 175) —one of the most influential 
researchers in this field— recently criticized 
ECLAC'S concern over the net outflow of re-
sources. According to him, the substantial net 
payments to creditors are not "perverse" but a 
healthy sign, since they promote the reduction of 
the debt in relative terms and speed up the arriv-
al of the day on which the Latin American 
c o u n t r i e s will r ecover the i r image of 
creditworthiness and their normal access to cred-
it. It is also argued that the anxiety about the 
negative transfers and the contraction of imports 
is misplaced, since the adjustment policies will 
promote the production of tradeable goods and 
especially of exports. In their turn the growth of 
the latter will increase the capacity to import, 
even with the transfer of resources to creditors. 
This argument has some validity in the 
l4Indeed, the figure was close to 14%. According to 
Ffrench-Davis (1985, p. 10) the positive transfer of the banks 
to Latin America in 1981 was US$ 10.5 billion, which is 
equivalent to 6% of the total bank debt in 1980. The same 
author estimated the negative flow in 1983 at US$ 18.8 bil-
lion, which equals 8% of the total commitments at the beginn-
ing of that year. 
medium term, but it falls down through its de-
ficient consideration of the time factor in the 
adjustment process. In fact, in the short run the 
price-elasticities of exports and imports are fre-
quently low, because of rigidities in the realloca-
tion of resources to tradeable goods15. Thus, a 
debtor country tackling the adjustment without 
adequate external financing will be forced to 
generate a trade surplus by a disproportionate 
compression of its imports and a reduction of its 
economic activity. This negative adjustment is 
magnified in so far as the world economy is in 
recession and their is no dynamic external de-
mand. The foregoing well describes what hap-
pened to Latin America in 1982-1983: there was 
an overestimation of the effects of resource 
reallocation and an underestimation of the need 
for credit, which resulted in an abrupt fall in 
imports and per capita income. It is precisely in 
this context that the negative transfers and the 
adjustment they required were "perverse" and 
socially inefficient. 
If the debtors' payment problem had been 
characterized by a lack of liquidity, as the pro-
ponents of negative transfers affirmed, the 
logical prescription would have been very dif-
ferent from what was actually experienced in 
Latin America. It is well known that the classic 
process of efficient adjustment based on the 
reallocation of resources suffers from time-lags 
which make it evolve in the form of the famous 
J-curve. To maintain the symmetry, a socially 
efficient adjustment should include new credit in 
the form of an inverted J. In other words, there 
was a logical reason to expect that during the 
initial phase of the adjustment the transfer from 
the creditors should have been nil or slightly 
positive, but not negative. And the coefficient of 
debt to exports should have tended to rise 
temporarily and not fall. Only when it had been 
confirmed that the reallocation of resources 
obtained the anticipated effect on the overall 
growth of exports and on the substitution of im-
ports should there have been a commencement 
of substantial transfers to the creditors and the 
sustained reduction of the coefficient of debt to 
exports. 
l5The bottlenecks are of an economic, social and politi-
cal nature. Of course, the seriousness and nature of the obsta-
cles vary considerably among the countries. 
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The root of the problem lies in the fact that 
during the 1970s the anticyclical components of 
the international financial system (the in-
ternational public lenders) shrank excessively, 
while the procyclical elements (the private banks) 
expanded far too much. When the crisis broke 
out in 1982 the system was highly unbalanced 
and could only tackle the problem in an ad hoc 
manner with makeshift measures. Although the 
crisis was well handled in the sense that it rescued 
the international Financial system, the result was 
achieved at the expense of Latin American de-
velopment16. 
The dilemma was evident from the start. In the 
face of the massive procyclical withdrawal of the 
banks, the IMF —whose relative international 
position had declined— 17 was in no condition 
even to begin to fill the gap. In these circum-
stances it decided to transforms itself rapidly into a 
catalyst for the mobilization of private funds; 
acting in conjuction with the large banks, it made 
many of is stand-by programmes conditional on 
the aforesaid 7% formula for the expansion of 
credit. But it has been seen that in face of the 
rigidity of resource reallocation and the de-
pressive effects of the world recession, the ex-
pansion of 7% was not enough to promote a 
socially efficient adjustment. Furthermore, it is 
by no means evident that the recent initiatives of 
the creditors to reduce the new obligations still 
further have been expedient, since so far there 
has been no trustworthy evidence that Latin 
American exports are responding favourably to 
the adjustment prescribed by the Fund. 
Still more disturbing, however, is the Utopian 
view of these events held by many analysts of the 
North. The contraction of imports and the fall in 
economic activity (which implied a reduction in 
the investment required to reinfource future 
payment capacity) are assessed positively as an 
"overperformance" in the process of adjustment 
(Wallich, 1985, p. 1; Cline, 1984b, p. 15). At the 
l 6 I t is interesting to recall that Marxist theory predicts 
that in a financial crisis the capitalist system will always tend to 
sacrifice the value of productive capital on the altar of finan-
cial capital (Weeks, 1981, pp. 123 to217). This interpretation 
seems to have some affinity with the handling of the present 
crisis in Latin America. 
" U p to 1970 IMF quotas were approximately equivalent 
to 10% of the annual value of world trade; when the crisis 
arose, they had fallen to 4% (Cline, 1984a, p. 124). 
same time there are repeated expressions of 
"confidence in the appropriateness of the cur-
rent strategy" (de Larosière, 1985, p. 200). Mean-
while, those who put forward more equitable 
ways of solving the debt problem —which would 
imply carrying out fundamental reforms— are 
considered as mere wet blankets by the support-
ers of the orthodox strategy. 
It is really difficult for an economist con-
cerned with economic development to un-
derstand this complacent attitude. The only 
reason for optimism that there could be in the 
face of an adjustment which has so ruthlessly 
violated the most fundamental principles of a 
social market economy is that, to speak quite 
frankly, there is in some circles the implied 
assumption that Latin Americans are irrespon-
sible and that the International Monetary Fund is 
unable to control them. This would create a need 
to impose a forced and onerous adjustment. Un-
fortunately this seems to be the assumption that 
has guided a large part of the policy of the credi-
tor countries18. 
b) How can the transfers to the banks be reduced? 
Only economic growth will allow the servic-
ing of the debt. Payment cannot be sustained in 
circumstances in which the per capita product is 
falling or stagnant, and in any case it would be 
counterproductive. On the one hand, without 
growth the servicing of the debt rapidly ceases to 
be a technical matter and is converted into a 
political problem in which, in the last resort, even 
the authorities most committed to the in-
ternational system have to take steps in favour of 
the national public interest19. On the other hand, 
l 8 The new economic analyses of the debt are often led 
astray by an exaggerated Benthamism as regards rationality 
and the calculation of costs and benefits. In other words, 
according to this theory, if the cost of bad behaviour of a 
debtor is less than its benefit, the rational debtor will always 
opt for the former without considering the general welfare. 
There can be no doubt that this represents a development of 
the concept of homo económicas to a level which undermines its 
usefulness for diagnosis and subscription. 
l 9 The industrial countries have reacted in a similar way. 
For example, during the 1930s the Governments of England 
and France suspended the servicing of their debt with the 
United States on the grounds that their obligations to their 
peoples were more important than their commitments to 
their foreign creditors (Hardy, 1982, p. 40). 
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the sacrifice of investment and human capital to 
pay the debt today only reduces the capacity to 
pay tomorrow. 
The recent reduction in world interest rates 
has given some relief to the debtors. But the 
decisive factor for restoring the capacity for pay-
ment is an exogenous stimulus which would be 
achieved with the so deeply desired sustained 
expansion of the OECD economies and the con-
sequent improvement in the terms of trade for 
Latin America. However, the possibility of a sub-
stantial recovery remains elusive and the outlook 
is very uncertain. Without a greater advance in 
this field, the dynamics of economic develop-
ment and the servicing of the debt will continue 
in open conflict. In the short term, with a view to 
increasing domestic economic activity, many of 
the debtor countries must reduce their transfers 
to the foreign banks. 
Naturally, to reduce the amount of the trans-
fer implies a cost for the creditors. If this cost 
could not be completely covered by the financial 
institutions it would have to be shared with the 
OECD governments, by the application of some 
type of systematic public intervention in order to 
mitigate the burden of the debt. This should not 
be viewed primarily as a bailout of the debtors 
and the banks, but should be regarded as "sound 
economic policy"20. It should be remembered 
that the great crises of indebtedness invariably 
arise in a context of major negative externalities 
which induce market failure. During the crisis, 
new negative externalities arise which tend to 
prolong it. Hence it has been customary for gov-
ernments to intervene with a view to re-
moline {1984a, pp. 133 to 135) criticizes the numerous 
proposals demanding reforms and international public ac-
tion to give relief to debtors and creditors, because inter alia 1) 
the problem of the debt, according to him, is one of liquidity 
and not solvency; and 2) the proposals frequently imply losses 
for the banks and would prejudice future access to credit by 
the debtors. He forgets, however, that the solution even of 
liquidity problems may be long delayed, so that the main-
tenance of the status quo will turn out to be a very burdensome 
and socially inefficient policy. On the other hand, it is not 
inevitable that public measures to alleviate the crisis will in-
volve losses for the banks; all depends on how this is 
arranged. Finally, the question of future access to credit ¡s a 
false dilemma, since even the most optimistic projections of 
the Latin American balance of payments do not open up 
prospects of a positive transfer from the creditors for many 
years. 
establishing order and confidence in the market. 
Unfortunately, in economic systems based on 
private markets, public solutions are scarce goods 
and frequently do not appear until the costs of 
the problem have been internalized by the main 
economic agents. As long as the banks and their 
governments can externalize the costs of the cri-
sis, passing them on to the debtors, there will be 
less incentive to apply a public solution. This 
explains in part why the numerous proposals for 
public intervention in the crisis have not borne 
fruit21. 
In view of the obstacles to public solutions, in 
the immediate future the debtor countries will 
have to tackle the banks directly on the subject of 
the transfer of resources. How the countries do 
this will depend, inter alia, on their importance as 
debtors, on their bargaining power and on their 
ability to adjust themselves to the debt servicing 
required. 
i) The cases of illiquidity. It would still be 
reasonable to believe that some of the more im-
portant debtor countries (for example, Brazil 
and Mexico) face temporary liquidity problems. 
Their economies tend to be more closed and 
industrialized and their markets are relatively 
better organized and are capable of exporting 
—and in fact are exporting— manufactured 
goods with some success. Hence their capacity 
for adjustment is apparently quite good, even 
when confronted with a sluggish world economy. 
Moreover, the authorities of these countries have 
acted as if they had a problem of liquidity, accept-
ing without serious objections the orthodox pro-
gramme of commercial rescheduling offered by 
the creditors as the best way of rapidly recovering 
the image of creditworthiness required to re-
enter the Eurocurrency market. This, of course, 
has meant giving up the idea of obtaining new 
credits in the third round of rescheduling22. 
2
 'The only major public solution introduced in the crisis 
is the participation of the IMF in the adjustment programmes 
and in the organization of the new credits. Nevertheless, this 
"public good" has been of much more benefit to the creditors 
than to the debtors. A more detailed analysis of the role of the 
Fund appears in Devlin, 1984 (pp. 55 to 57, 66 and 67). 
Ground ( 1984) has made a critical assessment of the Fund's 
adjustment programmes. 
22Mexico did not request new credits in the third round. 
In 1984 Brazil likewise announced that it would not request 
new loans. However, the civil government which recently 
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This good behaviour has been socially very 
burdensome, since during the period of 
rescheduling both countries have suffered se-
vere economic depressions. But this cost has been 
in some degree voluntary, since both borrowers 
have gigantic debts and a geopolitical importance 
which gives them considerable bargaining power 
with the creditors and their governments. In fact, 
each country in itself alone practically constitutes 
a debtor carter, which would presumably make 
them tough contenders in the game of bilateral 
monopoly described above. Nonetheless, they 
have exercised this power very selectively, 
obtaining only marginal advantage in their quest 
for reincorporation into the autonomous credit 
market. Their position as quasi-cartels and the 
hope of achieving a rapid adjustment to restore 
their image of creditworthiness also help to ex-
plain why these countries have been very 
cautious as to regional co-operation in relation to 
the debt and above all in regard to the formation 
of a Debtors' Club. 
If these major debtors come to consider that 
the promised return to the Eurocurrency market 
is being too long delayed, it is possible that, in the 
face of prolonged economic stagnation, they may 
exert greater pressure on the banks to obtain a 
reduction of the negative transfer. Unless the 
authorities change their views on the nature of 
the problem (that is, lack of liquidity), it is im-
probable that these countries will use their 
bargaining power to capture a larger amount of 
the monopoly rents obtained at present by the 
banks. They will rather tend to be co-operative 
and will try to negotiate agreements which main-
tain the commercial character of the rescue 
arrangements, avoiding manifest losses for the 
creditors. This might lead to a greater compres-
sion of the negotiated cost of credit, which can 
fall a little more and still appear as commercial. 
But the real objective will be the procurement of 
new loans to refinance interest payments. 
There seem to be sufficient space for 
negotiating new involuntary credits. The forced 
loans to Brazil and Mexico in 1983-1984 were 
more or less equivalent to ex ante expansions of 
18% and 13%, respectively, of the outstanding 
took office has hinted that the country might possibly now 
need to have recourse to new credits. 
commitments in the biennium; ex post they re-
sulted in lower increases (8% and 12%)23. 
Cline's analysis (1984a, pp. 71 to 75) shows 
that with a firm bargaining position and very 
little probability of default after obtaining new 
credit, it is profitable for the banks to grant an 
expansion of up to 40% in their loan portfolio24. 
Krugman's model (1984, p. 21) is even more 
explicit in respect of the capacity to obtain new 
forced loans. According to him, in conditions of 
lack of liquidity a bank will always have a motive 
for lending enough to avoid default, provided 
that the new loans do not exceed the amount of 
the servicing of the debt25. 
To sum up, the more powerful borrowers, 
faced with what they consider to be problems of 
lack of liquidity, could probably reduce transfers 
to the banks if they were disposed to exercise 
their bargaining power, by hinting that the 
alternative to the granting of new loans could be 
default. According to the analyses of Cline and 
Krugman, in not requesting these loans they are 
in fact virtually paying a subsidy to the banks. 
Hitherto the major debtors have apparently felt 
that it is worth while to pay the subsidy with a 
view to achieving their reincorporations into the 
voluntary credit market —the benefit of which 
would be, presumably, the positive transfer of 
resources from the banks, although at a much 
lower level than that recorded in the 1970s. 
ii) The cases of insolvency. There are debtors in 
the region —generally small and medium-sized 
countries— which present problems that begin to 
look very like those of insolvency26. Without a 
23Bank for International Settlements (1983 and 1985). 
For the ex ante expansion, the new loans for 1983 and 1984 
were calculated as a percentage of the pending commitments 
at the end of 1982 and 1983 respectively. The ex post increase 
simply equals the effective commitments for 1984 divided by 
those for 1982. 
24Cline ignores the time factor. It is assumed that the 
amount of new loans in any year could not exceed the value of 
the interest payments. 
2 5This is expedient for the bank, because in this way it at 
least receives some return. 
2 6 There are others, obviously, which fall in a gray area 
between lack of liquidity and insolvency. It is possible that 
Argentina is one of these. Its debt is the third largest in the 
region and it has the greatest burden of interest, with pay-
ments equal to more than 50% of its exports (ECLAC, 1984b, 
table 14). Nevertheless, it is a relatively rich and industrialized 
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relatively vigorous economic expansion in the 
OECD area, they could only adjust themselves to 
debt servicing on commercial terms if they 
agreed to subject themselves to a profound and 
politically unacceptable economic depression. 
(Indeed, some of these borrowers might find the 
servicing of the debt intolerable even in more 
favourable external economic conditions.) The 
growing realization that the problems are persist-
ing strengthens the creditors' reluctance to pro-
vide relief by granting new loans. In reality, with 
the passing of time the banks will be more dis-
posed to risk losses because most of the debtors 
are not large and because, since 1982, these in-
stitutions have been strengthening their balances 
with a view to coping with such contingencies. 
These debtor countries have every incentive 
to try to capture more fully the monopoly rents 
of the banks and achieve a greater alleviation of 
the debt, since their possibilities of returning to 
the voluntary credit market in the foreseeable 
future are remote. Ironically, however, it is dif-
ficult for them to capture these rents because 
their individual negotiating power is small and 
their open economies are relatively vulnerable to 
reprisals. Nonetheless, something can be done. 
The safest way for a debtor country to avoid 
confrontation with the banks is to informally fall 
into arrears. The banks can threaten a declara-
tion of default, but it is very improbable that they 
will do so as long as the country continues to 
express its good faith, the desire to fulfil its 
obligations, and a wish to negotiate. To begin 
with, declarations of default are legally onerous 
and imply a great loss of time for the banks, with 
meagre tangible benefits (Kaletsky, 1985). 
Secondly, the creditors do not wish to create a 
"martyr", since this might damage their own 
public image, perhaps provoking reactions of 
solidarity among the borrowers. Moreover, if the 
bank supervisors insist on reclassifying the loans, 
the banks will be in a position to absorb the loss of 
country, possessing a highly skilled labour force, and it has 
the ability to generate trade surpluses rapidly. Its heavy debt 
with the banks (US$ 46 billion) gives it considerable negotiat-
ing power. It attempted to make use of this power in 1984 to 
escape from the orthodox pattern of rescheduling; it failed, 
however, partly because at that time it had no convincing 
economic programme to legitimize its bargaining position. 
income which this would imply. In short, unless 
they are directly provoked, it is most probable 
that the creditors will turn a blind eye and treat 
the borrower as another special case. In this way 
no one comes off too badly. 
Under this strategy, the borrower must 
amortize the short-term credit lines in a normal 
way so as to minimize the incentive to withdraw 
them. Some lines will inevitably be lost, but it will 
always be possible to obtain the essential financ-
ing through the mediation of various creditors 
who foresee possibilities of profit in relatively 
risk-free trade finance. The selective deposit 
of international reserves is another way of 
obtaining commercial credit from the banks. In 
addition, the borrower must be willing to make 
periodic nominal payments to the creditors on 
its medium-term debts to demonstrate his good 
faith. These payments, however, can be main-
tained at levels as low as 1% or 2% of the out-
standing obligations. At an interest rate of 10% 
there is a saving of eight to nine points on the 
remittance of foreign exchange27. Although this 
does not represent a bonanza —especially for 
countries which have less than 50% of their debt 
with the banks— it does provide a worthwhile 
margin of relief which, together with other mea-
sures, will help recovery. 
The debtor must also be prepared to face 
possible reprisals. The international reserves will 
need to be deposited in safe institutions. A firm 
of lawyers will have to be retained in New York or 
London to formulate a contingency plan to pro-
tect the country's trade from possible legal action 
and to defend its interests in foreign courts if 
necessary. 
This strategy has proved its feasibility: there 
are already some borrower countries in a defacto 
situation of default which have managed to avoid 
reprisals. There are two main disadvantages. 
First, if many borrowers use the same strategy, 
the losses of the banks may reach critical levels. 
Nonetheless, this might turn out to be beneficial, 
because it would gradually demonstrate that the 
costs of the crisis were being internalized in the 
a7The net saving would be rather less if, in the face of 
arrears, the interest rate for the credit lines rises. At the same 
time, this saving should be compared with the possibility (if it 
exists) of obtaining new credits. 
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centre, which might stimulate a quest for an in-
tegral international public solution to the prob-
lem of indebtedness. Second, the borrower will 
have to be ready to cope with a precarious situa-
tion and one of increasing tension with the banks 
as the arrears accumulate. The uncertainty 
which this situation implies can in itself be prej-
udicial to the efforts for economic recovery. 
Owing to this second problem, it would cer-
tainly be preferable to work out a definite plan of 
debt relief on non-commercial conditions. The 
problem is that the banks do not wish to adopt 
rescheduling projects of this kind through fear 
of the demonstration effects: if they rescheduled 
a borrower's debt on non-commercial terms, oth-
ers might demand the same treatment. The fear 
of precedent makes it a risky business for small 
and medium-sized debtors to try to impose a 
unilateral plan of non-commercial payments on 
the banks {for example, the issue of long-term 
bonds at low interest rates). Indeed the banks 
and their governments might feel sufficiently 
provoked to face the cost of starting reprisals. 
At all events, the feasibility of a unilateral 
course is greater if it is proposed in very serious 
and conciliatory terms and is also associated with 
a serious economic programme which offers 
some prospect of improvement in the country's 
external situation. With regard to the payment 
formulas, whether negotiated or imposed uni-
laterally, they should be linked pari passu with 
the country's capacity to pay28. In this way the 
banks would have at least the possibility that 
some day their loans would produce a com-
mercial rate of return and the hope that their 
sacrifices would not be permanent. At the same 
time, the formulas should be designed, if pos-
sible, to minimize the losses of the banks at any 
given level of relief. The best formulas will de-
pend on the type of banking legislation in force 
in the North and will therefore possibly have to 
be "made to measure", in order to adjust to the 
particular circumstances of each country. 
28For example, it might be specified in the agreement 
that if the terms of trade recover a normal level x, the debts 
will be serviced at a commercial rate (e.g., LIBOR plus some 
spread). Or, alternatively, the payments might be limited to 
some maximum percentage of exports. A third possibility is 
to define a reasonable rate of economic growth (for example, 
5%) and then allocate the remainder of available foreign 
exchange to the servicing of the debt. 
For the small and medium-sized debtors, any 
major initiative in the payment programmes 
should perhaps be made in conjuction with oth-
ers. The bilateral monopoly framework de-
scribed above clearly points to co-operation 
among borrower countries. The banks have 
shrewdly formed a cartel to protect their own 
interest and avoid the losses that competition 
among them would imply. With the exception of 
the two or three biggest debtors, the monopoly 
power of the creditors cannot be countered by a 
country in isolation29. Hence, responsible co-
operation among debtor countries is a possible 
form of neutralizing the monopoly power of the 
banks and reaching a more socially efficient solu-
tion to the problem of indebtedness. Moreover, 
this co-operation need not be regional: two or 
three debtors together will constitute a formida-
ble negotiating bloc. 
The key point to remember regarding co-
operation is that the creditors and their gov-
ernments will not make a present of any con-
cessions to the debtor countries. The capitalist 
centre of today frequently acts on the basis of 
cold marginal cost-benefit calculations; as long as 
the politico-economic cost to themselves of doing 
nothing about the problem of the debtors is less 
than the benefits received, the creditors and their 
governments will most likely support the status 
quo. Only when the crisis of the debtors begins to 
threaten the centre with higher costs will there be 
incentives to explore new ways of dealing with 
the problem. Thus the various forms of co-
operation among the debtors are a way of bring-
ing home more clearly to the centre the potential 
costs of following its current policy, which arbi-
trarily sacrifices economic development to finan-
cial discipline30. 
Finally, it must be stressed that negotiations 
with the creditors are always improved when the 
countries —even in the worst situations— show 
that they are making serious efforts to solve their 
29The banks recognize the benefits of unequal power; 
this is why they insist so categorically on case-by-case negotia-
tions in the rescheduling. 
30It is interesting to note that the groups with less 
economic and political power in the centre have traditionally 
obtained reforms of the system by using co-operation and 
protest, as happened, for example, with the trade union 
movement and the great civil rights campaign in the United 
States in the 1960s. 
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main economic imbalances31. A coherent policy 
which steers the economy in the right direction 
helps the banks to justify their concessions and 
also encourages regulatory authorities to adopt a 
flexible attitude with regard to loans. 
2. The flight of capital 
We have already seen that another component of 
negative net transfers of resources is the signifi-
cant flight of capital. Using the "errors and 
omissions" item of the balance of payments as a 
rough indicator of this pehenomenon, table 4 
shows that in 1982-1983 alone there was an out-
flow of close on US$ 18 billion of non-registered 
capital in the balance of payments, which equals 
slightly more than a third of the total negative 
transfer registered in that period. 
The flight of capital largely originates in the 
private sector's traditional profit motive and in 
the undermined confidence in the public man-
agement of the economy, especially as regards 
exchange rate policy, inflation, domestic interest 
rates, etc. Moreover, the fact that there have been 
substantial outflows of non-registered capital 
since 1980 suggests that the confidence of private 
capital was declining in some countries long be-
fore the official outbreak of the crisis32. 
BIS (Bank for International Settlements) (1983 and 1985): 
The maturity distribution of international bank lending, De-
cember 1983 and July 1985. 
Cline, W. (1984 a): International debt: systematic risk and policy 
response. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics. 
(1984 b): "The issue is illiquidity, not solvency". 
Challenge, July-August 1984, pp. 12-20. 
Diaz-Alejandro, C. (1984): "Latin American debt: I don't 
3 l For some unorthodox adjustment policies see ECLAC 
(1984a) and Gurrieri and Sáinz (1983). 
32Some estimates of the flight of capital are impressive. 
T h e Bank for International Settlements has given a figure of 
US$ 50 billion between 1978 and 1982 (The Economist, 1984, 
p . 75). 
But the phenomenon of the flight of capital 
is not wholly independent of the behaviour of the 
private banking system. First, it was the latter's 
loans in the 1970s and 1980s which sustained the 
over-valued exchange rates and the fiscal deficits 
which have helped to change the expectations 
of the private economic agents33. Second, the 
procyclical withdrawal of loans in 1982 de-
stabilized the Latin American economies still 
further, thus accelerating the flow of capital to 
the exterior . Fur thermore, Carlos Diaz-
Alejandro (1984, pp. 377 to 380), highlights the 
complicity of the banks in this flight, through 
their refusai to disclose interest payments made 
to their clients and through their active campaign 
to capture Latin American deposits. 
The large amount of capital deposited 
abroad is a potential source of finance. But it is 
unlikely that this will return voluntarily until the 
prospects of growth are restored. Consequently, 
without the return of autonomous bank loans, or 
a public solution to the problem of indebtedness 
which will reduce negative transfers, even that 
part of the capital which might be subject to 
repatriation will remain in Europe or the United 
States, where the profitability is greater than that 
which could be provided by a Latin America be-
set by economic depression. 
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